Artificial Water Bodies Are Not Yet Riparian in Michigan
In Michigan, riparian rights have long been treated as a special, almost sacred, category of property interest. These rights flow only to lands that touch the natural waters of an inland lake or stream. They include the ability to install a dock, to moor boats, to fish and swim, and to otherwise enjoy direct use of the water. They are considered part and parcel of the land itself and are inseparable from ownership of the shoreline. Yet the law is equally clear that not every body of water creates riparian rights. When the water body is artificial—whether dug as a pond, constructed as a reservoir, or carved into a subdivision plat—it does not trigger the unique privileges and protections that come with riparian ownership.
Michigan courts have consistently maintained this distinction. The Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in Thies v Howland, 424 Mich 282 (1986), while primarily addressing rights in natural watercourses, articulated the principle that riparian status is tied to natural waters. Artificial lakes and ponds, by contrast, are the product of human creation and therefore fall outside of riparian law. Michigan appellate courts have repeatedly echoed that conclusion, declining to recognize riparian privileges where the underlying water is man-made. Even if a man-made lake is large, deep, and recreationally useful, it does not confer riparian status upon the adjoining lots.
The practical consequence is that landowners who border artificial waters do not automatically enjoy the common-law privileges associated with riparian ownership. Instead, their rights come from contract, easement, or restrictive covenant. A subdivision association may create boating or dock rights through bylaws. A developer may record easements giving lot owners access to the water. These are enforceable agreements, but they are not riparian rights in the legal sense. They can be altered, modified, or even revoked, unlike the enduring property interest that exists along natural lakes and streams.
This bright-line rule has served Michigan law well by preserving the historic doctrines that tie riparian rights to the state’s natural inland lakes and rivers, which are also subject to the public trust doctrine. Yet the distinction is not necessarily the last word. In other jurisdictions, courts have wrestled with whether artificial water bodies that take on the characteristics of natural lakes over time might eventually qualify as riparian. A prominent example is the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Alderson v Fatlan, 231 Ill 2d 311; 898 NE2d 595 (2008). There, the court considered whether an artificially created lake, which had existed for decades and functioned as if natural, should be treated as such for riparian purposes. The Illinois court acknowledged the possibility of an “artificial-becomes-natural” rule: that through the passage of time, integration with natural hydrology, and long-standing public and private reliance, an artificial body of water might be legally reclassified as natural.
Michigan courts have not yet addressed this question directly. For now, the established rule remains that artificial waters are not riparian. But the reasoning of Alderson raises intriguing possibilities for future litigation in Michigan. Many artificial lakes in this state, especially older quarry lakes or large subdivision impoundments, have existed for half a century or more. Some are fed by groundwater or natural springs, stocked with fish, and indistinguishable from natural inland lakes in appearance and ecological function. Homeowners and developers who have invested heavily in such properties may one day test whether Michigan law should recognize riparian rights when artificial waters have, through the passage of decades, become integrated into the landscape as if they were natural.
Such a claim would raise difficult questions. Should the law adapt to recognize the functional realities of Michigan’s many artificial lakes? Or should it remain anchored to the strict historical distinction between natural and artificial? Courts would be asked to balance the predictability of property law against the equitable interests of long-standing property owners who have reasonably come to treat their lakes as natural. The public trust doctrine, which safeguards natural waters for all citizens, would also loom in the background, since extending riparian status to artificial lakes may complicate how the state regulates and preserves natural resources.
Until a Michigan court takes up the question, the conservative and safe assumption is that artificial lakes do not create riparian rights. Purchasers of property adjoining such waters must rely on recorded covenants or association bylaws for their rights of access and use. Developers and associations must be careful in their representations, as marketing an artificial lake as “riparian” risks misinforming buyers. But the law is never static. Just as Alderson v Fatlan opened the door to the concept of artificial waters evolving into natural ones under Illinois law, it is not impossible that a Michigan litigant could press for similar recognition here. Such a case would ask the courts to decide whether time, use, and natural processes can transform an artificial body of water into one that the law must treat as riparian.
For now, the safest conclusion remains the traditional one: riparian rights are only attached to natural lakes and streams, and artificial waters are excluded. Yet the possibility of an “artificial-becomes-natural” rule lingers on the horizon. Should such litigation arise, it will mark a new and significant chapter in Michigan’s riparian jurisprudence, potentially altering the balance between human-made landscapes and the natural legal doctrines that have guided Michigan property law for over a century.